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The oyster industry in Connecticut has assumed proportions
which would have been incredible a generation ago.
The State oyster lands are taxed at a valuation of about
$700,000, while the town or in-shore lots are for the same purpose
valued at probably half that amount. These values are exclusive
of the shell-fish on these lands, and notoriously less than their
actual worth. The capital invested in the business exceeds three
millions of dollars.
Such aspects of the gentle bivalve supporting this enor-
mous industry as appeal to the lawyer and the owner may there-
fore be sufficiently important to excuse a brief consideration of
them.
But why discuss the legal status of an oyster, it may be asked.
Is that any less well understood or more worthy of a monograph
than the legal status of the dredge which brings it to the surface,
or the knife which opens it?
Certain claims regarding that status which have recently come
to the attention of the writer lead him to think that he might
approach the subject with this his taper, and perhaps not find the
neighborhood all bathed in light.
Connecticut oyster grounds are, as is well known, divided into
State or deep water, and town or in-shore lots. The line between
them was finally determined and described in Chap. 123 of the
laws of 1882, and will be found in Sec. 2315 of the present General
Statutes. South of that line the State Shell Fish Commissioners
make allotments and exercise control. North of it the town com-
-nittees alone may make original designations.
The different rules which govern the acts of these two bodies
it is not my purpose to consider for they are clearly defined by the
statutes and in the main well understood. Nor are the vexed
questions of natural beds, and non-resident owners within the
purview of - this sketch. These might well claim an article by
themselves.
I propose to speak simply of the title or estate which an oyster-
planter obtains in the parcel of ground allotted to him and of the
legal character of the oysters which are cultivated on it.
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In State lands the grantee obtains a "perpetual franchise for
planting and cultivating shell-fish" (Sec. 2318). In town lands
he obtains the "exclusive right of using" them for the same
purpose (Sec. 2349).
These two rights are probably identical,1 and are technical
franchises or branches of the State's prerogative.
The planter obtains a right of use or easement only and that
for a particular specified purpose. The public in its organized or
unorganized capacity retains all of the rights in and over the land
in question which it ever had so far as these are not inconsistent
with that particular use. Title to the land itself is plainly not
conveyed by the allotment.
As to State lands the statute says "the right to use and
occupy said grounds for said purposes shall be and remain in said
grantee and his legal representatives" (Sec. 2319).
As to town lands it is provided that the interest acquired shall
be the "exclusive right * * * of using such place for the
purpose of planting or cultivating oysters, clams or mussels, there-
in" (Sec. 2349). It is worthy of note that town committees convey
nothing. They only "designate" a place in which the'statute
then gives the applicant the above right.
Our statute book does not seem to have ever decided to its
own complete satisfaction whether the planter's interest in his
oyster lot is real estate or personal property.
In sections 602 and 1170 it provides that such interest "shall"
be treated as personal estate in certain designated cases. This
implies that normally it would be real estate, or else, perhaps, that
without such provision it would be difficult to tell just what it was.
In sections 917 and 119o it provides that for purposes of
attachment and levy of execution such lots "may" be treated as
real estate. This on the other hand implies that normally they
might well be considered personal property. When the omniscient
and omnipotent statute book finds it necessary to make them real
estate for one purpose and personal property for another who
shall presume to say what they were before, or would be now if
left alone.
Are not these franchises most nearly akin to easements in gross
in the land of the State which, ordinarily non-transferable or
descendible, are made by special enactment assignable inter vivos
(Secs. 2317 and 2349) and the property of the personal representa-
tive (as distinguished from the heir) at the owner's death (Sec.
602) ?
1 Clinton z. Bacon, 56 Conn. top p. 517.
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If they partake of the nature of ordinary realty they would of
course be transferable only by deed duly witnessed and acknowl-
edged, and it is a curious if not an important fact that deeds of
State lands by direction of the late Chief justice (Sec. 2317) are
ordinarily so executed while town lands are but rarely if ever so
conveyed.
Leaving this branch of our subject with regret that we cannot
be quite certain whether a transfer of town oyster lots needs wit-
nesses and an acknowledgment or not; but in the hope that the
statute has autocratically made such property alternately (but
definitely) real estate and chattels in all other cases where that
question is of importance, let us turn to the character of an oyster.
Let it be said in limine, however, that if this discussion, by pro-
voking in the minds of future consumers of this placid edible dis-
tressing queries as to what sort of property they are converting,
shall abate one whit from the historic delight of that pursuit, it
will have no conceivable excuse for its existence.
In brief then, is an oyster in process of cultivation on its arti-
ficial bed, real estate or personal property?
To state it more accurately, is it part and parcel of the fran-
chise so as to pass ipsofacto by a mere transfer of that, or, does it
require separate conveyance? And -as a corollary to this-will
a mortgage of that franchise, "with the oysters thereon growing,"
duly executed and recorded, hold the oysters as against bona fide
purchasers or attaching creditors without a change of their pos-
session ?
It may quite possibly be true that the solution of this problem
is too simple to merit extended attention or justify the allotment
of any space in this magazine to its discussion; but as has been
already intimated the diversity of ex teyqore opinions which the
writer has been favored with of late from leading members of the
bar when they were asked the question, has led him to make this
attempt to throw, if possible, some light upon it, unaccompanied
by any claim that it is thereby solved.
It will be assumed that the owner of the soil or franchise as the
case may be, has no greater right, ipsofacto, to the oysters thereon
than to the long or soft shell clams therein, for such a clam is
evidently far more parcel of the soil than an oyster is. Author-
ties which define the status of these clams will therefore apply,
with at least equal force to oysters. And further, it seems prob-
able that an oyster upon a lot, title to the soil of which is in an
individual, will belong to him, as incident to that ownership, cer-
tainly no less than it would belong to the owner of a mere ease-
ment in the soil as incident to such easement.
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In the case of Peck v. Lockwood, 5 Day 22 (1811) the owner
of a parcel of flats under water at high tide sued one who had
entered upon it, dug long clams and taken them away. It will be
noticed that actual title to the soil itself existed in the plaintiff
here.
It was held that the defendant had taken nothing which
belonged to the plaintiff, and the court remarked in the course of
its opinion that the claimed right of the defendant so to do was
"in perfect consistency with the plaintiff's title to the soil." -
This case is approved in Chapman v. Kimball, 9 Conn. 38, and
Mather v. Chapman, 40 Conn. 399, in the latter of which cases the
court remarks that both shell-fish and sea-weed, when by the
receding tide they are left exposed upon the shore do not belong
to the owner of the soil, but "confessedly remain common prop-
erty."
The case of Gallup v. Tracy, 25 Conn. io, related to the owner-
ship of oysters planted by the plaintiff upon a piece of ground
allotted to him by the committee of his town. In this case the
plaintiff owned the franchise or easement and not the soil. In
the course of his opinion Ellsworth J. says, "we think the plain-
tiff had acquired a vested right in the oysters which he had laid
down and to the occupation of the place where he laid them down."
This form of expression would seem to indicate that the first
Tight or title was independent of the second.
No further light upon our question has been found in the Con-
necticut reports.
The case of Proctor v. Wells, 103 Mass. 216 (x869), was an
action of trespass, quare dausum, for entering upon the plaintiff's
close, diggihg clams thereon and carrying them away.- The court
in its opinion, says:
"A grant by the Legislature to a town of the title in the bed of a river or
in flats covered by tide-water within its limits does not convey by implication
the right of fishing to the town as its own property; for the right of fishing not
being an incident to the right ofjOroperty in the soil but a public right to take
the fish which whether moving in the water or imbedded in the mud covered
by it depend upon the water for their nourishment and existence is unaffected
by the question whether the title in the land under the water is in the common-
wealth, in the town, or in private persons."2
The case of State v. Taylor, 27 N. J. Law 117 (1858), was an
indictment for "stealing oysters, the goods and chattels of one
George Hildreth." They had been planted by him on a bed duly
2 See also Weston v. Sampson, 8 Cush. 347; Porter V. Shehan, 7 Gray 435;
Lakeman v. Burnham, 7 Gray 437; and Moulton v. Libbey, 37 Maine 472.
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staked out, but the right to the use of which had apparently not
been conveyed to him by the State.
The court below charged the jury that if the oysters in ques-
tion were not upon a natural oyster bed so that they might be said
to have been abandoned to the public, "they were the subjects of
larceny "- that is to say, they were the owner's chattels.
This charge upon appeal was approved and the character of
oysters as chattels and subjects of larceny distinctly affirmed.
The following cases in New York also hold that oysters planted
on a designated bed for cultivation are the personal chattels of the
planter.3
The court in Brinkerhoff v. Starkins for instance says:
"It is not doubted that oysters are animals feer nattre, nor that the sea
or navigable bays and rivers are their natural element. * * * The only
right which a person can acquire to animals fera' natura, is a qualified prop-
erty in them; that is they are his property while they continue in his keeping
or actual possession. But if they escape or if he permits them to go at large
his property instantly ceases unless they have animum revertendi which it is
said can only be known by their custom of returning (2 Bl. Com. 392). If the
intention to return exists in contemplation of law, the possession continues.
In the case, however, of the animals in question no power of locomotion
exists. They cannot of their own act either escape or return. It follows
then that a man can have property in them only when he has an actual pos-
session."
This of course suggests the consideration which should be
decisive of our present question and has doubtless been in the
mind of the reader from the outset, namely, that oysters are ani-
mals and, if real estate, enjoy the proud distinction of being the
only animals kept for sale which are so honored. It is true that
in England deer in a park, doves in a cote, and conies in a war-
ren, are "heir looms," and descend with the estate, but no possible
question of heir looms attaches to our present subject and the
whole doctrine is declared by Washburne (Real Est. vol. i, p. *6)
to have no place in this country.
Oysters may not be the most perfect type of animals fere nat-
ure. Some of the authorities venture to question their predatory
character and roving instincts. But they are certainly animals,
and that consideration must be given its full weight in determin-
ing with which of the two great divisions of property they should
be classed.
They do not need fences or cords for their restraint and yet
8 People v. Hagen. 121 N. Y. 316; Fleet v. Hyman, 14 Wendell 42; Decker
v. Fisher, 4 Barb. 594; Brinkerhoff v,. Starkins, ii Barb. 252; Loundes v,.
Fisher, 34 Barb. 586.
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there seems to be no good reason to claim that round or hard-shell
clams and oysters are different species of property, although the
former will travel many feet in a tide and bury itself in the sand
at the end of its journey. While the oyster does not migrate, it is
never buried, but always lies upon the surface of its bed.
Like a herd of cattle they are first put in one lot then often
shifted to another until they come to be in fit condition for the
market, and always moved from their bed several times before
being finally taken up for use.
It has been already noted that neither the State nor the towns
in taxing oyster lots take the shell-fish upon them into considera-
tion as forming any part of their intrinsic value.
We conclude, therefore, that by nature, on principle, by the
common law, and by custom, oysters are chattels and not an
inherent part of the planter's lot or franchise.
Nor do our statutes seem to alter this their normal status.
As has been already seen, four sections fix the character of
oyster lots, making them real estate for two purposes and personal
property for two others.
Only one section specifically attaches any character to the
oysters themselves, namely, section 602, and that makes them
personal estate for Probate Courts as ante-prandial custom has
long since made them for all the rest of us.
It may perhaps be asked why decree them to be chattels if
they were already so? But if they partook of the character of
their bed, why was it necessary to specifically make them per-
sonal estate in addition to, and as well, as that ?
The answers to these questions would probably throw less light
upon our subject than upon the discriminating care of the statute
makers.
At common law oysters are surely chattels and to make them
anything else the statute should definitely so specify and not
attempt a new creation by argumentative intendment.
Sections 2349 and 2398, and several similar ones in the General
Statutes, use much unnecessary language if oysters share the fate
of their resting places.
If no one had ever heard of "trees in a nursery" or "potatoes
in a field," it is not likely that two answers would ever be given
to the question at issue.
A moment's reflection will suffice to make the distinction
between the two cases clear.
If it be true then that oysters were originally chattels and that
their character has not been changed by legislation, our question"
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would seem to be answered, and we may safely say that their
ownership is not transferred by a mere conveyance of their bed,
and that to mortgage them successfully a change of possession will
be necessary.
Should this question ever intrude itself upon the hospitality of
our Court of Errors it is of course impossible to say how consid-
erations, then for the first time presented, might affect their judg-
ment and control their decision.
There is one precedent of acknowledged weight and ancient
lineage, however, which has not yet been cited and which might
possibly be followed by them as suggesting after all the best solu-
tion of the difficulty. It is reported as follows:
Once (says an author; where, I need not say)
Two travelers found an oyster in their way.
Both fierce, both hungry, the dispute grew strong,
While, scale in hand. Dame Justice passed along.
Before her each with clamor pleads the laws,
Explains the matter and would win the cause.
Dame Justice, weighing long the doubtful right,
Takes, opens, swallows it before their sight.
The cause of strife removed so rarely well,
"There! take (says Justice) take ye each a shell,
We thrive at Westminster on fools like you.
'Twas a fat oyster-live in peace-Adieu."
John H. Perry.
